Keeping friends close, and relations closer

Characterising America's interests in East Asia last week following US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's tour of the region and Japanese Premier Taro Aso's visit to Washington, Philip Stevens cast America's dealings with Japan as still its most important friendship in the region, but its dealings with China as nevertheless its most important relationship. If the ferocious recent growth of China doesn't prove Sisyphean, soon a similar framework will be established on a global scale: America's partnership with the developed democracies of the world will remain much closer than that with China, but that with China will have most bearing on the course of the world.

If we assess the major issues facing the global community - trade (and energy) security, economic crises, failed states, state conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and human rights - there exists a rough consensus of rhetoric addressing them all among the major powers: even China pays lip service to 'democracy' and the rights of its people and others. But there is a dramatic sliding scale of agreement as to the significance and shape of appropriate policies in each of these areas. In practice, the Chinese leadership places states' rights inviolably above those of people, almost always sees the needs of development trumping those of the environment, and is much more sanguine about the prospect of a nuclear Iran. The governments of the developed democracies, meanwhile, typically give greater weight to each of these issues and advocate a much more proactive policy with respect to them. It is much easier for Europe, America, Japan and Australia to elaborate a common position concerning them than it is to bring China on board.

Over the weekend, the US and China held defence talks that signalled warmer relations between the two countries set to dominate the 21st century, and highlighted the areas where China is, in contrast, a much more willing partner. Discussions centred on anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, where People's Liberation Army vessels have been operating since January - their first ever 'out of area' mission. Another important topic on the agenda was the security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan - the first time bilateral Chinese-American talks on the region had been held. America is clearly hoping that China will become a responsible stakeholder in the world and is encouraging it in that direction - and so it should.

For the clout of Beijing to go untapped would be maddess. There are clearly issues on our list above - trade security, economic issues, failing states, conflict and terrorism - were there is a broader, if far from complete, pattern of agreement as to the neccesary steps the major powers must take to secure stability in the world. Such a situation points to the renewed concert of great powers that the G20 meeting in London in April seems to suggest is now emerging. But it would equally foolhardy to abandon completely heightened cooperation of developed democracies which has since the fall of the Soviet Bloc served as the de facto primary mechanism of global governance, with its institutional expression in the G7 and the Bretton Woods' institutions. For while it is neccesary than emerging powers are given a seat at the top tables as soon as possible, a corrolary to such a reordering is that if issues which usually lie beyond the strategic and development concerns of such powers are to be pushed, the developed world must find even stronger mechanisms to coordinate their positions on such issues. If we want progress on human rights, the environment and nuclear proliferation in the future, it is vital that the developed democracies of the world strengthen their own concert, on top of nuturing that of the world as a whole. We need a G20, but a G20 only makes a reinvigorated club of developed democracies more important than before.