What just happened?

After months of tensions: war in Georgia, and an overwhelming Russian victory. "Both sides are to blame" for the recent conflict, argues the Economist, "but it ran according to a Russian plan". Why? "Given the scale and promptness of Russia’s response, the script must have been written in Moscow."

Russia won the war through a combination of sheer numbers and air support. The 58th army had been parked in the Northern Caucasus for months. But had it been Moscow's plan all along to make a point about Russian capability and regional might, it could have done so with a technological as well as numerical edge. Instead, as Jane's, the military intelligence group, points out, "Russia did not appear to use its more modern weapons in this short campaign, as the units nearest to Georgia were equipped with older equipment, much of it fielded over 20 years ago". The technological backwardness of its units at times got them into trouble, and despite the comprehensive nature of its swift success against an inferior foe, the campaign served to demonstrate to the rest of the world the continuing inadequacies of Russia's post-Soviet military machine. Russia could have had a much cleaner victory had it brought its technological superiority to bear. That it did not suggests that this was a war that Russia did not necessarily expect to fight.

Unless we assume that Russia remains incapable of deploying the more sophisticated tools of modern warfare at its disposal - not inconceivable given the sclerosis of much of modern Russian armed services, but still not likely - or take the paranoid view that it was simply keeping its gunpowder dry for bigger battles to come, it remains a real possibility that Russian forces were in the region in such substantial numbers as a deterrent to Georgian actions as much as a threat. Moscow found itself obliged to deploy them once it became clear that the conflict in South Ossetia was nevertheless escalating, and an outright Georgian victory was potentially in sight.

I remain of the belief that had NATO offered Georgia MAP status - with the greater western commitment to its defence that this entailed - a conflict on the scale witnessed in recent weeks would likely have been avoided. The prospect of facing the American military itself would have given Russian generals a much larger headache than 37000 partially-American trained troops. But perhaps Moscow in the run up to this war was merely hoping to influence the calculations of Georgian generals in a similar way. By taking the recent war far past the break-away enclaves and into Georgia proper, Russia has once again underlined the malign nature of its post-imperial pretensions in the region, and has sought to foster instability for its own ends. But that does not necessarily mean that this was a desired war.