The origins of autocracy

Thomas L. Friedman (via Free Exchange) argued in the New York Times on Wednesday that NATO only has itself to blame for Russia's recent assertiveness and aggression.

The humiliation that NATO expansion bred in Russia was critical in fuelling Putin’s rise after Boris Yeltsin moved on. And America’s addiction to oil helped push up energy prices to a level that gave Putin the power to act on that humiliation.

Friedman wants us to believe that Russia would have become a normal neighbour to its near abroad and a partner of the west, had but NATO stayed where it was in 1991, or even ceased to exist altogether. This is to entirely misread the origins of Putin's autocracy.

Russia in the 1990s was never a liberal democracy. It could have become so, like much of the rest of the former soviet bloc, and it still can. But the key episodes that prevented it from doing so before now have little to do with NATO, or indeed with the world beyond Russia's borders at all; they can only be understood within its own domestic context. Boris Yeltsin failed to use his popularity and constitutionally mandated extraordinary powers to craft a balanced constitution in 1992. He ended up shelling the Russian parliament when it defied him in 1993 and imposing a new constitution with an irresistibly powerful presidency later that year. Having undermined liberal democracy and the rule of law, events conspired to tarnish the reputation of the market economy as well, with Russia suffering from rampant inflation, following the price liberalisations of 1992, and then the financial crisis of 1998. Putin's ascent to the Presidency was a result of his astute handling of the Second Chechen war, but his success since is down to the Presidential powers bequeathed to him by Yeltsin, and genuine popularity due to the stable society - in comparison to the economic chaos of the 1990s - over which he has presided.

American and European demand for natural resources has undoubtedly helped the Russian economy, and thus indirectly helped solidify Putin's grip on power. But you cannot blame NATO expansion for Russian autocracy; nor for the current imperatives of Russian foreign policy. It is untenable to suggest that Russia would have contained itself had NATO never crossed the Oder. Russia's regional assertiveness stems from a desire for recognition as a great power rooted in its continuing autocracy; an autocracy shaped by its domestic trajectory rather than its geopolitical position. Were it not for the NATO membership of a great number of Russia's former satellites, the situation in Europe would now be a lot worse.