Mulling over Moscow

Both the US and Russia want strategic arms reduction, a Taliban and terrorist-free Afghanistan and a non-nuclear Iran. They disagree over the role of US power in Eastern Europe and the presence of a missile shield in its centre. At first glance, these latter issues pale next to the former, and the importance of minimising the risk of a nuclear atrocity. Might they be abandoned in the pursuit of a 'grand bargain' with Russia to pursue the greater goals?

The outlook for US-Russian relations is certainly warmer under President Obama than it would have been under a President McCain. McCain never minced his words about the Russian state or President-cum-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in whose very eyes he claimed "to see the letters K, G and B". His characterisation of the Russian system as a "new Authoritarianism" may well have been accurate, but such candidness would undoubtedly have soured relations between the Bear and the Eagle right from the start. Yet even Mr Obama doesn't have it easy dealing with Moscow - anti-Americanism is much more entrenched in the old heartland of the Soviet Union than across the rest of Europe and the new President will gain less of a boost for simply not being George Bush.

Of the matters over which the two powers broadly agree, a new START treaty limiting the numbers of nuclear warheads and ICBMs is widely held to be the easiest to garner agreement on. Russia is at least prepared to offer logistical support to NATO troops in Afghanistan, even if it is making America's life difficult in Central Asia by encouraging the closure of its remaining military bases there.

Tactics differ considerably over Iran, meanwhile, with Washington in recent years much more inclined to take a hard line with Tehran and leave the military option on the table. But a broad compromise firmly tying together the central European missile shield and Iran would be viable, with America agreeing to slow down its plans to build radar and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland in return for much greater levels of Russian support in putting pressure on the Iranians. After all, not pursuing the shield until the threat of an Iranian missile attack becomes much more immediate would have the added bonus of convincing the Russians that it is in fact designed to counteract Iranian missiles and not their own.

But not all US-Russian tensions can be so easily lumped together and solved at a stroke. There may indeed be a temptation in Washington to buy Russian support elsewhere by quietly abandoning support for Atlanticist leaders in countries in Russia's 'near abroad'. Ukraine and Georgia are at best imperfect democracies, and are former Soviet Republics that the Kremlin has long deemed to be firmly within its own sphere of influence. Letting it dictate to governments in Tblisi and Kiev might seem a cheap price to pay for the promise of a safer world, with fewer nuclear warheads, a stable Afghanistan and a neutralised Iran.

This would be a grave error. While governments anywhere in the world are democratising and looking to the Open World, the Open World - and especially America, as its most prominent and powerful member - should offer them support. It might seem like the short term expedience of abandoning liberalising regimes for the sake of harsh Realpolitik outweighs any moral imperatives - perhaps in times of crisis, such as at the height of the Cold War, it does. But the power of reputation and consistency of action should never be underestimated. Letting nascent democracies fall on the edge of Europe will make entrentching democracy anywhere in the future even harder, as governments all over the world learn what a fickle friend the Open World proved to be. Russia, meanwhile, will learn that bullying and aggression work; such a pact may in fact increase its intransigence on other issues as it again digs its heals in and tries to extract the maximum concessions avaliable. The alarm of other former Soviet satellites, even those safely behind the borders of both NATO and the EU, would further destabilise the region should America begin withdrawing its backing from those most in need.

Russia is a vital partner on many of the most imporant issues President Barack Obama faces, but it can be encouraged to cooperate on most of them because it is in its own interests to do so. Care must be taken not too offer too much in a vain attempt to win Russia round. If the price asked for such cooperation is an abandonment of liberal values it is probably a price too high.