23/04/08
Dear Gerd,
thanks for your response. To address your last question first: yes, we do want Georgia in NATO. You worry about its stability, and the potential for conflict over the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rightly so: this is precisely why NATO is needed in Georgia as a guarantor of peace and territorial integrity. NATO has played such a role in the past, welcoming in the western half of a divided Germany in 1955 and seeing it through to unification 35 years later. The commitment of NATO members to collective self-defence made the 'salami tactics' which the Soviet empire had used to absorb much of eastern Europe virtually impossible after 1949; membership for Ukraine and Georgia would send a clear message that the open world continues to be prepared to defend like-minded states today. The events of even the past fortnight have demonstrated that not only is such a message clearly needed, but that Russia responds positively when the open world presents a united front.
Since failing to secure MAP status at the Bucharest conference, Georgia has found itself under increasing pressure on its northern frontier, most recently evinced by the shooting down of an unmanned Georgian spy plane over Abkhazia on April 22nd. Russia had already taken steps to secure Abkhazia and South Ossetia within its economic orbit, offering hefty subsidies to the breakaway regions, ending decade-old sanctions against them in March and counting Abkhazian companies as Russian when seeking tenders for the construction of sites for the Sochi Olympics. It went a step further last week when it moved to establish official links and recognise certain Abkhazian and South Ossetian documents. The open world responded with belated if commendable vigour to these attempts at formalising de facto annexation, with both the EU and NATO weighing in to express their concern. Russian President Vladimir Putin was compelled to soften his stance, and decree that the 18 month-old postal and visa restrictions on Georgia should be brought to an end, and that talks should be held on similarly winding down a Russian embargo on trade. The lesson is clear. Moscow is conciliatory when the open world acts in unison, but will act to destabilise and dismember Georgia if it thinks Tbilisi is isolated and weak. Just as NATO's promise of collective security prevented war between Germany and Europe's western and eastern halves for the duration of the Cold War, so NATO represents the best hope of avoiding conflict between Georgia, its breakaway regions and their northern backer. A credible NATO deterrent is the best guarantee of Georgian peace and stability. The open world faces a direct challenge. It is one at which it should not baulk.
You rightly argue that Moscow is ruing its lost influence, and searching for a post-imperial role in its 'near abroad'. But if this is to be benign, Moscow must cease deliberate destabilisation and recognise the right of other governments to determine their own foreign policies. It is in Russia's own long term interests for the open world to take a firm line now, and demonstrate that its future lies in co-operation with its neighbours, not confrontation. You are right that open values are suffering from a crisis of legitimacy within Russia; but this is no reason to simply abandon our principles, or, indeed, our security. You go on to argue that missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic is aimed at Russia. It is not. The handful of inceptor missiles envisaged by the system does not even begin to undermine a Russian nuclear deterrent composed of thousands of warheads which can be fired from land, sea or air. America's offer to delay activation of the system until a concrete threat emerges, and its invitation to Russia to station liaison officers at each site, appears to have soothed the concerns of President Putin, who has toned down his rhetoric since the NATO summit and now talks instead about building "transparency and trust". There is no longer any question that this is a system aimed at rogue states such as Iran, and not a mere anti-Russian provocation as you assert. The open world is not, and should not, back Russia into a corner. But it cannot allow Moscow a veto over its defence.
You also mischaracterise NATO is a 'soldier-for-hire' without purpose. Its geographical extent may be a relic of the Cold War, but its commitment to defend the open world remains as relevant as ever. Much of western Europe may feel safe beneath its defensive umbrella, having not fought a war on home soil for over half a century, but the open world and its values remain under threat. NATO was called upon in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the chances are that it will, sadly, be called upon again. Potential new member states such as Ukraine and Georgia have an important role to play in providing the manpower NATO needs to meet its commitments; Georgia has already put existing members to shame with its willingness to deploy troops in Afghanistan. Full membership is the logical reward for helping to bear the burden of our mutual defence.
Finally, you worry that NATO should not be used to 'export' our values. I agree: it should not. Certainly, no government should be forced to join a military alliance. But Ukraine and Georgia have found their own way to the open world, and, having made it there, and with both governments looking to NATO for support, we should not turn them away. As we approach parliamentary elections, due on May 21st, Georgian democracy remains troublingly flawed, with question marks over media freedoms and judicial independence, but this should be a call to action to help foster Georgian development, not to abandon it in the face of Russian aggression. As I mentioned in my last letter, MAP status itself entails democratic benchmarks, but of course the first function of NATO is military; there are other organisations which are better placed to encourage institution building, such as the EU, and I would gladly make the case for EU expansion in another debate. For now, it suffices to note that NATO has proved a bridge into the other structures of the open world in the past, notably for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic who joined the alliance in 1999 and the union in 2004, and I see no reason, save a lack of political will among EU member states, why it should not do so again. Ukraine and Georgia are nascent members of the open world and they should be defended as such. MAP status should be granted as soon as possible.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Yours truly,
Benedict J. White
Wednesday, 23 April 2008
Lost without a MAP 2
The response to the response.
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